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Abstract
We are interested in risk constraints for infinite horizon discrete time Markov decision processes
(MDPs). Starting with average reward MDPs, we show that increasing concave stochastic dominance
constraints on the empirical distribution of reward lead to linear constraints on occupation measures.
The optimal policy for the resulting class of dominance-constrained MDPs is obtained by solving a
linear program. We compute the dual of this linear program to obtain average dynamic programming
optimality equations that reflect the dominance constraint. In particular, a new pricing term appears
in the optimality equations corresponding to the dominance constraint. We show that many types of
stochastic orders can be used in place of the increasing concave stochastic order. We also carry out a
parallel development for discounted reward MDPs with stochastic dominance constraints. The paper
concludes with a portfolio optimization example.
1 Introduction
Markov decision processes (MDPs) are a natural and powerful framework for stochastic control problems.
In the present paper, we take up the issue of risk constraints in MDPs. Convex analytic methods for
MDPs have been successful at handling many types of constraints. Our specific goal is to find and study
risk constraints for MDPs that are amenable to convex analytic formulation. It turns out that stochastic
dominance constraints are natural risk constraints for MDPs.
Convex analytic methods are well studied for Markov decision processes. The linear programming ap-
proach for MDPs is pioneered in [30], and an early survey is found in [3]. The main idea is that some MDPs
can be written as convex optimization problems in terms of appropriate occupation measures. [5, 21, 6, 25]
discuss a rigorous theory of convex optimization for MDPs with general Borel state and action spaces. De-
tailed monographs on Markov decision processes are found in [26, 27, 34]. Constrained MDPs can naturally
be embedded in this framework. Constrained discounted MDPs are explored in [18, 19]. [1] is a substantial
monograph on constrained MDPs. Constrained discounted MDPs in Borel spaces are analyzed in [22], and
constrained average cost MDPs in Borel spaces are developed in [23]. Infinite dimensional linear program-
ming plays a fundamental role in both [22, 23], and the theory of infinite dimensional linear programming
is developed in [2]. The special case of constraints on expected utility in discounted MDPs is considered in
[29]. MDPs with expected constraints and pathwise constraints, also called hard constraints, are considered
in [32] using convex analytic methods. An inventory system is detailed to motivate the theoretical results.
Policies in MDPs induce Markov chains. Typically, policies are evaluated with respect to some measure
of expected reward, such as long-run average reward or discounted reward. The variation/spread/dispersion
of policies is also critical to their evaluation. Given two policies with equal expected performance, we would
prefer the one with smaller variation in some sense. Consider a discounted portfolio optimization problem,
for example. The expected discounted reward of an investment policy is a key performance measure; the
downside variation of an investment policy is also a key performance measure. When rewards and costs are
involved, the variation of a policy can also be called its risk.
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Risk management for MDPs has been considered from many perspectives in the literature. [20] includes
penalties for the variance of rewards in MDPs. The optimal policy is obtained by solving a nonlinear
programming problem in occupation measures. In [37], the mean-variance trade-off in MDPs is further
explored in a Pareto-optimality sense. The conditional value-at-risk of the total cost in a finite horizon
MDPs is constrained in [4]. It is argued that convex analytic methods do not apply to this problem type and
an offline iterative algorithm is employed to solve for the optimal policy. [35] develops Markov risk measures
for finite horizon and infinite horizon discounted MDPs. Dynamic programming equations are derived that
reflect the risk aversion, and policy iteration is shown to solve the infinite horizon problem.
Our notion of risk constrained MDPs differs from this literature survey. We are interested in the empirical
distribution of reward, rather than in its expectation, variance, or other summary statistics. Our approach is
based on stochastic orders, which are partial orders on the space of random variables, see [33, 36] for extensive
monographs on stochastic orders. [9, 10] use the increasing concave stochastic order to define stochastic
dominance constraints in single stage stochastic optimization. The increasing concave stochastic order is
notable for its connection to risk-averse decision makers, i.e. it captures the preferences of all risk-averse
decision makers. A benchmark random variable is introduced, and a concave random variable-valued mapping
is constrained to dominate the benchmark in the increasing concave stochastic order. It is shown that
increasing concave functions are the Lagrange multipliers of the dominance constraints. The dual problem
is a search over a certain class of increasing concave functions, interpreted as utility functions, and strong
duality is established. Stochastic dominance constraints are applied to finite horizon stochastic programming
problems with linear system dynamics in [12]. Specifically, a stochastic dominance constraint is placed on
a vector of state and action dependent reward functions across the finite planning horizon. The Lagrange
multipliers of this dynamic stochastic dominance constraint are again determined to be increasing concave
functions, and strong duality holds. In contrast, we place a stochastic dominance constraint on the empirical
distribution of reward in infinite horizon MDPs. We argue that this type of constraint comprehensively
accounts for the variation in policies in MDPs.
We make two main contributions in this paper. First, we show how to formulate stochastic dominance
constraints for long-run average reward maximizing MDPs. More immediately, we show that stochastic
dominance constrained MDPs can be solved via linear programming over occupation measures. Our model
is more general than [12] because it allows for an arbitrary transition kernel and is also infinite horizon. Also,
our model is more computationally tractable than the stochastic programming model in [12] because it leads
to linear programs. Second, we apply infinite-dimensional linear programming duality to gain more insight:
the resulting duals are similar to the linear programming form of the average reward dynamic programming
optimality equations. However, new decision variables corresponding to the stochastic dominance constraint
appear in an intuitive way. Specifically, the new decision variables are increasing concave functions that
price rewards. This observation parallels the results in [9, 10, 13] and is natural because our stochastic
dominance constraints are defined in terms of increasing concave functions. The upcoming dual problems
are themselves linear programs, unlike the dual problems in [9, 10, 13] which are general infinite-dimensional
convex optimization problems.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we consider stochastic dominance constraints for long-
run average reward maximizing MDPs. In section 3 we formulate this problem as a static optimization
problem, in fact a linear programming problem, in a space of occupation measures. Section 4 develops the
dual for this problem using infinite dimensional linear programming duality, and reveals the form of the
Lagrange multipliers. In section 5, we discuss a number of immediate variations and extensions, especially
the drastically simpler development on finite state and action spaces. We illustrate our method in section 6
with a portfolio optimization example, and then conclude the paper in section 7.
2 MDPs and stochastic dominance
The first subsection presents a general model for average reward MDPs, and the second explains how to
apply stochastic dominance constraints.
2
2.1 Average reward MDPs
A typical representation of a discrete time MDP is the 5-tuple
(S, A, {A (s) : s ∈ S} , Q, r) .
The state space S and the action space A are Borel spaces, subsets of complete and separable metric spaces,
with corresponding Borel σ−algebras B (S) and B (A). We define P (S) to be the space of probability
measures over S with respect to B (S), and we define P (A) analogously. For each state s ∈ S, the set
A (s) ⊂ A is a measurable set in B (A) and indicates the set of feasible actions available in state s. The set
of feasible state-action pairs is written
K = {(s, a) ∈ S ×A : a ∈ A (s)} ,
and K is assumed to be closed in S × A. The transition law Q governs the system evolution. Explicitly,
Q (B | s, a) for B ∈ B (S) is the probability of visiting the set B given the state-action pair (s, a). Finally,
r : K → R is a measurable reward function that depends on state-action pairs.
We now describe two classes of policies for MDPs. Let Ht be the set of histories at time t, H0 = S,
H1 = K × S, and Ht = K
t× S for all t ≥ 2. A specific history ht ∈ Ht records the state-action pairs visited
at times 0, 1, . . . , t− 1 and the current state st. Define Π to be the set of all history-dependent randomized
policies : collections of mappings πt : Ht → P (A) for all t ≥ 0. Given a history ht ∈ Ht and a set B ∈ B (A),
π (B | ht) is the probability of selecting an action in B. Define Φ to be the class of stationary randomized
Markov policies : mappings φ : S → P (A) which only depend on history through the current state. For a
given state s ∈ S and a set B ∈ B (A), φ (B | s) is the probability of choosing an action in B. The class Φ
will be viewed as a subset of Π. We explicitly assume that both Π and Φ only include feasible policies that
respect the constraints K.
The state and action at time t are denoted st and at, respectively. Any policy π ∈ Π and initial
distribution ν ∈ P (S) determines a probability measure P πν and stochastic process {(st, at) , t ≥ 0} defined
on a measurable space (Ω,F). The expectation operator with respect to P πν is denoted E
π
ν [·]. Consider the
long-run expected average reward
R (π, ν) = lim inf
T→∞
1
T
E
π
ν
[
T−1∑
t=0
r (st, at)
]
.
The classic long-run expected average reward maximization problem is
sup R (π, ν) (2.1)
s.t. π ∈ Π. (2.2)
It is known that a stationary policy in Φ is optimal for problem (2.1) - (2.2) under suitable conditions (this
result is found in [34] for finite and countable state spaces, and [26, 27] for general Borel state and action
spaces).
2.2 Stochastic dominance
Now we will motivate and formalize stochastic dominance constraints for problem (2.1) - (2.2). To begin,
let z : K → R be another measurable reward function, possibly different from r. A risk-averse decision
maker with an increasing concave utility function u : R→ R would be interested in maximizing his long-run
average expected utility
lim inf
T→∞
1
T
E
π
ν
[
T−1∑
t=0
u (z (st, at))
]
.
However, it is difficult to choose one utility function to represent a risk-averse decision maker without
considerable information. We will use the increasing concave order to express a continuum of risk preferences
in MDPs.
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Definition 2.1. For random variables X, Y ∈ R, X dominates Y in the increasing concave stochastic order,
written X ≥icv Y , if E [u (X)] ≥ E [u (Y )] for all increasing concave functions u : R → R such that both
expectations exist.
Let C (R) be the set of all continuous functions f : R→ R. Let U (R) ⊂ C (R) be the set of all increasing
concave functions u : R→ R such that
lim
x→∞
u (x) = 0
and
u (x) = u (x0) + κ (x− x0)
for all x ≤ x0 for some κ > 0 and x0 ∈ R (the choices of κ and x0 differ among u). The second condition
just means that all u ∈ U (R) become linear as x→ −∞. By construction, functions u ∈ U (R) are bounded
from above by zero. We will use the set U (R) to characterize X ≥icv Y .
Now define (x)− , min {x, 0}. We note that any function in U (R) can be written in terms of the family{
(x− η)− : η ∈ R
}
. To understand this result, choose u ∈ U (R) and a finite set of points {x1, . . . , xj}. By
concavity, there exist ai ∈ R such that ai (x− xi) + u (xi) ≥ u (x) for all x ∈ R and for all i = 1, . . . , j. Each
linear function ai (x− xi) + u (xi) is a global over-estimator of u. The piecewise linear increasing concave
function
min
i=1,...,j
{ai (x− xi) + u (xi)}
is also a global over-estimator of u, and certainly
u (x) ≤ min
i=1,...,j
{ai (x− xi) + u (xi)} ≤ ai (x− xi) + u (xi)
for all i = 1, . . . , j and x ∈ R. As the number of sample points j increases, the polyhedral concave func-
tion mini=1,...,j {ai (x− xi) + u (xi)} becomes a better approximation of u. We realize that the function
mini=1,...,j {ai (x− xi) + u (xi)} is equal to a finite sum of nonnegative scalar multiples of functions from{
(x− η)− : η ∈ R
}
. It follows that the relation X ≥icv Y is equivalent to E
[
(X − η)−
]
≥ E
[
(Y − η)−
]
for
all η ∈ R. When the support of Y is contained in a compact interval [a, b], the condition E
[
(X − η)−
]
≥
E
[
(Y − η)−
]
for all η ∈ [a, b] is sufficient for X ≥icv Y .
From now on, let Y be a fixed reference random variable on R to benchmark the empirical distribution
of reward z. We assume that Y has support in a compact interval [a, b] throughout the rest of this paper.
Define
Zη (π, ν) , lim inf
T→∞
1
T
E
π
ν
[
T−1∑
t=0
(z (st, at)− η)−
]
to be the long-run expected average shortfall in z at level η. We propose the class of stochastic dominance-
constrained MDPs :
sup R (π, ν) (2.3)
s.t. Zη (π, ν) ≥ E
[
(Y − η)−
]
, ∀η ∈ [a, b] , (2.4)
π ∈ Π. (2.5)
For emphasis, we index η over the compact set [a, b] in (2.4). Allowing η to range over all R would lead to
major technical difficulties, as first observed in [9, 10].
Constraint (2.5) is a continuum of constraints on the long-run expected average shortfall of the policy π for
all η ∈ [a, b]. We will approach problem (2.3) - (2.5) by casting it in the space of long-run average occupation
measures. Then we will see that constraint (2.4) is equivalent to a stochastic dominance constraint on the
empirical distribution of rewards z, namely
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
z (st, at) ≥icv Y.
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To be clear, limT→∞
1
T
∑T−1
t=0 z (st, at) indicates a random variable on R, not the long-run average of z (st, at).
We can denote the feasible region of problem (2.3) - (2.5) succinctly as
∆ ,
{
(π, ν) ∈ Π× P (S) : R (π, ν) > −∞ and Zη (π, ν) ≥ E
[
(Y − η)−
]
for all η ∈ [a, b]
}
,
allowing problem (2.3) - (2.5) to be written as
ρ∗ , sup {R (π, ν) : (π, ν) ∈ ∆} ,
where ρ∗ is the optimal value.
Remark 2.2. We focus on the average reward case in this paper. The extension to the average cost case is
immediate. Let c : S ×A→ R be a measurable cost function. The long-run expected average cost is
C (π, ν) = lim sup
T→∞
1
T
E
π
ν
[
T−1∑
t=0
c (st, at)
]
.
Similarly, let z : S × A → R be another measurable cost function that possibly differs from c. Since z
represents costs, we want the empirical distribution of z to be “small” in a stochastic sense. For costs, it is
logical to use the increasing convex order rather than the increasing concave order. For random variables
X, Y ∈ R, X dominates Y in the increasing convex stochastic order, written X ≥icx Y , if E [f (X)] ≥
E [f (Y )] for all increasing convex functions f : R → R such that both expectations exist. Define (x)+ ,
max {x, 0}, and recall that the relation X ≥icx Y is equivalent to E
[
(X − η)+
]
≥ E
[
(Y − η)+
]
for all
η ∈ R. When the support of Y is contained in an interval [a, b], the relation X ≥icx Y is equivalent to
E
[
(X − η)+
]
≥ E
[
(Y − η)+
]
for all η ∈ [a, b].
Momentarily, let Y be a benchmark random variable that we require to dominate the empirical distribu-
tion of z. Define
Zη (π, ν) , lim sup
T→∞
1
T
E
π
ν
[
T−1∑
t=0
(z (st, at)− η)+
]
for all η ∈ [a, b]. We obtain the cost minimization problem
inf C (π, ν)
s.t. Zη (π, ν) ≤ E
[
(Y − η)+
]
, ∀η ∈ [a, b] ,
π ∈ Π.
The upcoming results of this paper all have immediate analogs for the average cost case.
3 A linear programming formulation
This section develops problem (2.3) - (2.5) as an infinite dimensional linear program. First, we discuss
occupation measures on the set K. Occupation measures on K can be interpreted as the long-run average
expected number of visits of a stochastic process {(st, at) , t ≥ 0} to each state-action pair. Next, we argue
that a stationary policy in Φ is optimal for problem (2.3) - (2.5). It will follow that the functions R (φ, ν)
and Zη (φ, ν) can be written as linear functions of the occupation measure corresponding to φ and ν. These
linear functions give us the desired linear program.
To proceed, we recall several well known results in convex analytic methods for MDPs. We will use
µ to denote probability measures on K, and the set of all probability measures on K is denoted P (K).
Probability measures on K can be equivalently viewed as probability measures on all of S×A with all mass
concentrated on K, µ (K) = 1. For any µ ∈ P (K), the marginal of µ on S is the probability measure
µˆ ∈ P (S) defined by µˆ (B) = µ (B ×A) for all B ∈ B (S).
The following two well known facts are ubiquitous in the literature on convex analytic methods for MDPs
(see [15] for example). First, if µ is a probability measure on K, then there exists a stationary randomized
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Markov policy φ ∈ Φ such that µ can be disintegrated as µ = µˆ ·φ where µˆ is the marginal of µ. Specifically,
µ = µˆ · φ is defined by
µ (B × C) =
ˆ
B
φ (C | s) µˆ (ds)
for all B ∈ B (S) and C ∈ B (A). Second, for each φ ∈ Φ and ν ∈ P (S), the probability measure µ = ν · φ
on S ×A satisfies µ (K) = 1 and µˆ = ν. Specifically, µ = ν · φ is defined by
µ (B × C) =
ˆ
B
φ (C | s) ν (ds)
for all B ∈ B (S) and C ∈ B (A).
We can integrate measurable functions f on K with respect to measures µ ∈ P (K). Define
〈µ, f〉 ,
ˆ
K
f (s, a)µ (d (s, a))
as the integral of f over state-action pairs (s, a) ∈ K with respect to µ. Then
〈µ, r〉 =
ˆ
K
r (s, a)µ (d (s, a))
is the expected reward with respect to the probability measure µ and
〈µ, (z − η)−〉 =
ˆ
K
(z (s, a)− η)− µ (d (s, a))
is the expected shortfall in z at level η with respect to the probability measure µ.
We need to restrict to a certain class of probability measures. For notational convenience, define r (s, φ) ,´
A
r (s, a)φ (da | s) and Q (· | s, φ) ,
´
A
Q (· | s, a)φ (da | s).
Definition 3.1. [23, Definition 3.4] A probability measure µ = µˆ · φ is called stable if
〈µ, r〉 =
ˆ
r (s, a)µ (d (s, a)) > −∞
and the marginal µˆ is invariant with respect to Q (· | ·, φ), i.e. µˆ (B) =
´
S Q (B | s, φ) µˆ (ds) for all B ∈ B (S).
When µ is stable, the long-run expected average cost R (φ, µˆ) is
R (φ, µˆ) = lim inf
T→∞
1
T
E
φ
µˆ
[
T−1∑
t=0
r (st, at)
]
= 〈µ, r〉,
by the individual ergodic theorem [38, Page 388, Theorem 6]. Then for stable µ = µˆ · φ ∈ P (K), it follows
that
R (φ, µˆ) = 〈µ, r〉 =
ˆ
S
r (s, φ) µˆ (ds) .
Similarly, for stable µ = µˆ · φ, it is true that
Zη (φ, µˆ) = 〈µ, (z − η)−〉 =
ˆ
S
[ˆ
A
(z (s, a)− η)− φ (da | s)
]
µˆ (ds)
for all η ∈ [a, b].
To see the connection between problem (2.3) - (2.5) and stable policies, let IΓ be the indicator function
of a set Γ in B (K). Define the occupation measure µ on K via
µπν,T (Γ) =
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E
π
ν {IΓ (st, at)} =
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
P πν {(st, at) ∈ Γ}
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for all Γ ∈ B (K). Then,
R (π, ν) = lim inf
T→∞
1
T
E
π
ν
[
T−1∑
t=0
r (st, at)
]
= lim inf
T→∞
〈µπν,T , r〉
and
Zη (φ, µˆ) = lim inf
T→∞
1
T
E
π
ν
[
T−1∑
t=0
(z (st, at)− η)−
]
= lim inf
T→∞
〈µπν,T , (z − η)−〉
for all η ∈ [a, b].
To continue, we introduce some technical assumptions for the rest of the paper. Let Cb (K) be the space
of continuous and bounded functions on K. The transition law Q is defined to be weakly continuous when´
S
h (ξ)Q (dξ | ·) is in Cb (K) for all h ∈ Cb (K).
Assumption 3.2. (a) Problem (2.3) - (2.5) is consistent, i.e. the set ∆ is nonempty.
(b) The reward function r is nonpositive, and for any ǫ ≥ 0 the set {(s, a) ∈ S ×A : r (s, a) ≥ −ǫ} is
compact.
(c) The function z (s, a) is bounded and upper semi-continuous on S ×A.
(d) The transition law Q is weakly continuous.
A function f on K is called a moment if there exists a nondecreasing sequence of compact sets Kn ↑ K
such that
lim
n→∞
inf
(s,a)/∈Kn
f (s, a) =∞,
see [26, Definition E.7]. When K is compact, then any function on K is a moment. Assumption 3.2(b)
implies that −r is a moment. By construction, all of the functions (z (s, a)− η)− are bounded above by zero
on S ×A for all η ∈ [a, b].
The next lemma reduces the search for optimal policies to stable policies. We define
∆s , {µ ∈ P (K) : µ is stable, µ = µˆ · φ and (φ, µˆ) ∈ ∆}
to be the set of all stable probability measures µ that are feasible for problem (2.3) - (2.5).
Lemma 3.3. Suppose assumption 3.2 holds. For each feasible pair (π, ν) ∈ ∆, there exists a stable probability
measure µ = µˆ · φ such that (φ, µˆ) ∈ ∆ and R (π, ν) ≤ R (φ, µˆ) = 〈µ, r〉.
Proof. For any (π, ν) ∈ ∆, there exists a stable policy µ = µˆ · φ such that
R (π, ν) ≤ R (φ, µˆ) = 〈µ, r〉
by [26, Lemma 5.7.10]. By the same reasoning,
E
[
(Y − η)−
]
≤ Zη (π, ν) ≤ Zη (φ, µˆ) = 〈µ, (z − η)−〉
for all η ∈ [a, b] so that µ = µˆ · φ is feasible.
Problem (2.3) - (2.5) is solvable if there exists a pair (π∗, ν∗) ∈ ∆ with R (π∗, ν∗) = ρ∗, i.e. the optimal
value is attained. When an optimization problem is solvable, we can replace ‘sup’ and ‘inf’ with ‘max’ and
‘min’. We use the preceding lemma to show that problem (2.3) - (2.5) is solvable.
Theorem 3.4. Problem (2.3) - (2.5) is solvable.
Proof. By lemma 3.3,
ρ∗ = sup {〈µ, r〉 : µ ∈ ∆s} .
Now apply the proof of [26, Theorem 5.7.9]. Let {ǫn} be a sequence with ǫn ↓ 0 and ǫn ≤ 1. For any ǫn,
there is a pair (πn, νn) ∈ ∆ with R (πn, νn) ≥ ρ∗− ǫn by the definition of ρ
∗. Again, by lemma 3.3, for each
(πn, νn) ∈ ∆ there is a pair (φn, µˆn) ∈ ∆ such that µn = µˆn · φn is stable and R (πn, νn) ≤ R (φn, µˆn) =
〈µn, r〉.
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By construction, 〈µn, r〉 ≥ ρ∗ − ǫn and ǫn ∈ (0, 1) for all n, so infn〈µ
n, r〉 ≥ ρ∗ − 1. It follows that
supn〈µ
n,−r〉 ≤ 1 − ρ∗. Since −r is a moment, the preceding inequality along with [26, Proposition E.8]
and [26, Proposition E.6] imply that there exists a subsequence of measures {µni} converging weakly to a
measure µ on K. Now
ρ∗ ≤ lim sup
i→∞
〈µni , r〉
holds since 〈µn, r〉 ≥ ρ∗ − ǫn for all n and ǫn ↓ 0. By [26, Proposition E.2],
lim sup
i→∞
〈µni , r〉 ≤ 〈µ, r〉,
so we obtain
ρ∗ ≤ 〈µ, r〉.
Since 〈µ, r〉 ≤ ρ∗ must hold by definition of ρ∗, the preceding inequality shows that 〈µ, r〉 = ρ∗, i.e. µ attains
the optimal value ρ∗ and is stable. By a similar argument,
E
[
(Y − η)−
]
≤ lim sup
i→∞
〈µni , (z − η)−〉 ≤ 〈µ, (z − η)−〉
since each 〈µni , (z − η)−〉 ≥ E
[
(Y − η)−
]
for all i and all η ∈ [a, b]. Thus, µ is feasible.
Let µ∗ be the optimal stable measure just guaranteed, and disintegrate to obtain µ∗ = µˆ∗ · φ∗. The pair
(φ∗, µˆ∗) is then optimal for problem (2.3) - (2.5) since
R (φ∗, µˆ∗) = 〈µ∗, r〉 = ρ∗,
and
Zη (φ
∗, µˆ∗) = 〈µ∗, (z − η)−〉 ≥ E
[
(Y − η)−
]
for all η ∈ [a, b].
From the preceding theorem, we can now write maximization instead of supremum in the objective of
problem (2.3) - (2.5),
ρ∗ , max {R (π, ν) : (π, ν) ∈ ∆s} .
We are now ready to formalize problem (2.3) - (2.5) as a linear program. Introduce the weight function
w (s, a) = 1− r (s, a)
on K. Under our assumption that r is nonpositive, w is bounded from below by one. The space of signed
Borel measures on K is denotedM (K). With the preceding weight function, defineMw (K) to be the space
of signed measures µ on K such that
‖µ‖Mw(K) ,
ˆ
K
w (s, a) |µ| (d (s, a)) <∞.
We can identify elements in Mw (K) with stable policies, and vice versa. First, observe that the space
Mw (K) is contained in the set of stable probability measures. If ‖µ‖Mw(K) <∞, then certainly
〈µ, r〉 =
ˆ
K
r (s, a)µ (d (s, a)) > −∞
since 1− r = w. Conversely, if µ is a stable probability measure, then it is an element of Mw (K) since
ˆ
K
w (s, a) |µ| (d (s, a)) =
ˆ
K
(1− r (s, a))µ (d (s, a)) = µ (K)− 〈µ, r〉 <∞.
Also define the weight function
wˆ (s) = 1− sup
a∈A(s)
r (s, a)
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on S which is also bounded from below by one. The space Mwˆ (S) is defined analogously with wˆ and S in
place of w and S ×A.
The topological dual of Mw (K) is Fw (K), the vector space of measurable functions h : K → R such
that
‖h‖Fw(K) , sup
(s,a)∈K
|h (s, a) |
w (s, a)
<∞.
Certainly, r ∈ Fw (K) by definition of w since
‖r‖Fw(K) = sup
(s,a)∈K
|r (s, a) |
w (s, a)
= sup
(s,a)∈K
|r (s, a) |
1 + |r (s, a) |
≤ 1.
Every element h ∈ Fw (K) induces a continuous linear functional on Mw (K) defined by
〈µ, h〉 ,
ˆ
K
h (s, a)µ (d ((s, a))) .
The two spaces (Mw (K) , Fw (K)) are called a dual pair, and the duality pairing is the bilinear form
〈u, h〉 : Mw (K) × Fw (K) → R just defined. The topological dual of Mwˆ (S) is Fwˆ (S), which is defined
analogously with S and wˆ in place of K and w.
We can now make some additional technical assumptions.
Assumption 3.5. (a) The function (z − η)− is an element of Fw (K) for all η ∈ [a, b].
(b) The function
´
S
wˆ (ξ)Q (dξ | s, a) : S ×A→ R is an element of Fw (K).
Notice that assumption 3.5(a) is satisfied if z ∈ Fw (K). To see this fact, reason that
‖ (z − η)− ‖Fw(K) ≤ ‖z − η‖Fw(K) ≤ ‖z‖Fw(K) + ‖η‖Fw(K),
where the first inequality follows from | (z − η)− | ≤ |z − η|. The constant function f (x) = η on K is in
Fw (K) since
‖η‖Fw(K) = sup
(s,a)∈K
|η|
w (s, a)
≤ |η|.
The linear mapping L0 : Mw (K)→Mwˆ (S) defined by
[L0µ] (B) , µˆ (B)−
ˆ
K
Q (B | s, a)µ (d (s, a)) , ∀B ∈ B (S) , (3.1)
is used to verify that µ is an invariant probability measure on K with respect to Q. The mapping (3.1)
appears in all work on convex analytic methods for long-run average reward/cost MDPs. When L0µ (B) = 0,
it means that the long-run proportion of time in state B is equal to the rate at which the system transitions
to state B from all state-action pairs (s, a) ∈ K.
Lemma 3.6. The condition µ ∈ ∆s is equivalent to 〈µ, r〉 > −∞ and
L0µ = 0,
〈µ, 1〉 = 1,
〈µ, (z − η)−〉 ≥ E
[
(Y − η)−
]
,∀η ∈ [a, b] ,
µ ≥ 0.
Proof. The linear constraints 〈µ, 1〉 =
´
K
µ (d (s, a)) = 1 and µ ≥ 0 just ensure that µ is a probability
measure on K. The condition L0µ = 0 is equivalent to invariance of µ with respect to Q. For stable
µ = µˆ · φ, R (φ, µˆ) = 〈µ, r〉 > −∞ and Zη (φ, µˆ) = 〈µ, (z − η)−〉. Since Zη (φ, µˆ) ≥ E
[
(Y − η)−
]
for all
η ∈ [a, b], the conclusion follows.
Next we continue with the representation of the dominance constraints (2.4). We would like to express
the constraints 〈µ, (z − η)−〉 ≥ E
[
(Y − η)−
]
for all η ∈ [a, b] through a single linear operator.
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Lemma 3.7. For any µ ∈ P (K), 〈µ, (z − η)−〉 is uniformly continuous in η on [a, b].
Proof. Write 〈µ, (z − η)−〉 =
´
K
(z (s, a)− η)− µ (d (s, a)). Certainly, each function (z (s, a)− η)− is contin-
uous in η for fixed s× a. Choose ǫ > 0 and |η′ − η| < ǫ. Then
| (z (s, a)− η′)− − (z (s, a)− η)− |
≤|z (s, a)− η′ − z (s, a) + η|
≤ǫ,
by definition of (x)−. It follows that
|
ˆ
S×A
(z (s, a)− η′)− µ (d (s, a))−
ˆ
K
(z (s, a)− η)− µ (d (s, a)) |
≤|
ˆ
K
ǫ µ (d (s, a)) |
=ǫ,
since µ is a probability measure.
The preceding lemma allows us to write the dominance constraints (2.4) as a linear operator in the space
of continuous functions. Recall that we have assumed [a, b] to be a compact set. Let C ([a, b]) be the space
of continuous functions on [a, b] in the supremum norm,
‖f‖C([a,b]) = sup
a≤x≤b
|f (x) |
for f ∈ C ([a, b]). The topological dual of C ([a, b]) is M ([a, b]), the space of finite signed Borel measures on
[a, b]. Every measure Λ ∈ M ([a, b]) induces a continuous linear functional on C ([a, b]) through the bilinear
form
〈Λ, f〉 =
ˆ b
a
f (η) Λ (dη) .
Define the linear operator L1 : Mw (K)→ C ([a, b]) by
[L1µ] (η) , 〈µ, (z − η)−〉, ∀η ∈ [a, b] . (3.2)
Also define the continuous function y ∈ C ([a, b]) where y (η) = E
[
(Y − η)−
]
is the shortfall in Y at level η
for all η ∈ [a, b]. The dominance constraints are then equivalent to [L1µ] (η) ≥ y (η) for all η ∈ [a, b], which
can be written as the single inequality L1µ ≥ y in C ([a, b]).
The linear programming form of problem (2.3) - (2.5) is
max 〈µ, r〉 (3.3)
s.t. L0µ = 0, (3.4)
〈µ, 1〉 = 1, (3.5)
L1µ ≥ y, (3.6)
µ ∈Mw (K) , µ ≥ 0. (3.7)
Since ρ∗ , max {R (π, ν) : (π, ν) ∈ ∆s}, and stable probability measures on K can be identified as elements
of Mw (K), problem (3.3) - (3.7) is equivalent to problem (2.3) - (2.5).
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4 Establishing strong duality
In this section we apply infinite-dimensional linear programming duality to obtain the strong dual to problem
(3.3) - (3.7). The development in [2] is behind our duality development, and the duality theory for linear
programming for MDPs on Borel spaces in general.
We will introduce Lagrange multipliers for constraints (3.4), (3.5), and (3.6), each Lagrange multiplier is
drawn from the appropriate topological dual space. Introduce Lagrange multipliers h ∈ Fwˆ (S) for constraint
(3.4). The constraint 〈µ, 1〉 = 1 is an equality in R, so introduce Lagrange multipliers β ∈ R for constraint
(3.5). Finally, introduce Lagrange multipliers Λ ∈ M ([a, b]) for constraints (3.6). The Lagrange multipliers
(h, β,Λ) ∈ Fw (S) × R ×M ([a, b]) will be the decision variables in the upcoming dual to problem (3.3) -
(3.7).
To proceed with duality, we compute the adjoints of L0 and L1. The adjoint is analogous to the transpose
for linear operators in Euclidean spaces.
Lemma 4.1. (a) The adjoint of L0 is L
∗
0 : Fwˆ (S)→ Fw (K) where
[L∗0h] (s, a) , h (s)−
ˆ
S
h (ξ)Q (dξ | s, a)
for all (s, a) ∈ K.
(b) The adjoint of L1 is L
∗
1 : M ([a, b])→ Fw (K) where
[L∗1Λ] (s, a) =
ˆ b
a
(z (s, a)− η)− Λ (d (s, a)) .
Proof. (a) This result is well known, see [26, 27].
(b) Write
〈Λ, L1µ〉 =
ˆ b
a
〈µ, (z − η)−〉Λ (dη)
ˆ b
a
[ˆ
K
(z (s, a)− η)−〉µ (d (s, a))
]
Λ (dη) .
When z is bounded on S ×A, then
|
ˆ
K
(z (s, a)− η)− (µ× Λ) (d ((s, a)× η)) | =|
ˆ
K
(z (s, a)− η)−
w (s, a)
w (s, a) (µ× Λ) (d ((s, a)× η)) |
≤‖ (z − η)− ‖Fw(K) ‖µ‖Mw(K)‖Λ‖M([a,b])
<∞,
since ‖µ‖M(K) = 1 and ‖Λ‖M([a,b]) <∞. The Fubini theorem applies to justify interchange of the order of
integration,
〈Λ, L1x〉 =
ˆ b
a
[ˆ
K
(z (s, a)− η)−〉µ (d (s, a))
]
Λ (dη)
=
ˆ
K
ˆ b
a
(z (s, a)− η)−〉Λ (dη)µ (d (s, a))
=
ˆ
K
〈Λ, (z (s, a)− η)−〉µ (d (s, a)) ,
revealing L∗1 : M ([a, b])→ Fw (K).
We obtain the dual to problem (3.3) - (3.7) in the next theorem.
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Theorem 4.2. The dual to problem (3.3) - (3.7) is
inf β − 〈Λ, y〉 (4.1)
s.t. r + L∗0h− β 1 + L
∗
1Λ ≤ 0, (4.2)
(h, β,Λ) ∈ Fwˆ (S)× R×M ([a, b]) , Λ ≥ 0. (4.3)
Proof. The Lagrangian for problem (3.3) - (3.7) is
ϑ (µ, h, β,Λ) , 〈µ, r〉 + 〈h, L0µ〉+ β (〈µ, 1〉 − 1) + 〈Λ, L1µ− y〉,
allowing problem (3.3) - (3.7) to be expressed as
max
µ∈Mw(K)
{
inf
(h,β,Λ)∈Fwˆ(S)×R×M([a,b])
{ϑ (µ, h, β,Λ) : Λ ≥ 0} : µ ≥ 0
}
.
We rearrange the Lagrangian to obtain
ϑ (µ, h, β,Λ) =〈µ, r〉 + 〈h, L0µ〉+ β (〈µ, 1〉 − 1) + 〈Λ, L1µ− y〉
=〈µ, r〉 + 〈L∗0h, µ〉+ 〈µ, β 1〉 − β + 〈L
∗
1Λ, µ〉 − 〈Λ, y〉
=〈µ, r + L∗0h+ β 1 + L
∗
1Λ〉 − β − 〈Λ, y〉.
The dual to problem (3.3) - (3.7) is then
inf
(h,β,Λ)∈Fwˆ(S)×R×M([a,b])
{
max
µ∈Mw(K)
{ϑ (µ, h, β,Λ) : µ ≥ 0} : Λ ≥ 0
}
.
Since µ ≥ 0, the constraint r + L∗0h+ β 1 + L
∗
1Λ ≤ 0 is implied. Since β is unrestricted, take β = −β to get
the desired form.
We write problem (4.1) - (4.3) with the infimum objective rather than the minimization objective because
we must verify that the optimal value is attained. The dual problem (4.1) - (4.3) is explicitly
inf β −
ˆ b
a
E
[
(Y − η)−
]
Λ (dη) (4.4)
s.t. r (s, a) +
ˆ b
a
(z (s, a)− η)− Λ (dη) ≤ β + h (s)−
ˆ
S
h (ξ)Q (dξ | s, a) , ∀ (s, a) ∈ K, (4.5)
(h, β,Λ) ∈ Fwˆ (S)× R×M ([a, b]) , Λ ≥ 0. (4.6)
Since r ≤ 0, problem (4.4) - (4.6) is readily seen to be consistent by choosing h = 0, β = 0, and Λ = 0.
Problem (4.4) - (4.6) has another, more intuitive form. In [9, 10, 12], it is recognized that the Lagrange
multipliers of stochastic dominance constraints are utility functions. This result is true in our case as well.
Using the family
{
(x− η)− : η ∈ [a, b]
}
, any measure Λ ∈M ([a, b]) induces an increasing concave function
in C ([a, b]) defined by
u (x) =
ˆ b
a
(x− η)− Λ (dη)
for all x ∈ R. In fact, the above definition of u gives a function in C (R) as well. Define
U ([a, b]) =cl cone
{
(x− η)− : η ∈ [a, b]
}
=
{
u (x) =
ˆ b
a
(x− η)− Λ (dη) for Λ ∈M ([a, b]) , Λ ≥ 0
}
to be the closure of the cone generated by the family
{
(x− η)− : η ∈ [a, b]
}
. The set U ([a, b]) ⊂ U (R) is
the set of all utility functions that can be constructed by limits of sums of scalar multiplies of functions in{
(x− η)− : η ∈ [a, b]
}
.
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Corollary 4.3. Problem (4.4) - (4.6) is equivalent to
inf β − E [u (Y )] (4.7)
s.t. r (s, a) + u (z (s, a)) ≤ β + h (s)−
ˆ
S
h (ξ)Q (dξ | s, a) , ∀ (s, a) ∈ K, (4.8)
(h, β, u) ∈ Fwˆ (S)× R× U ([a, b]) . (4.9)
Proof. Notice that the function
u (x) =
ˆ b
a
(x− η)− Λ (dη)
is an increasing concave function in x for any Λ ∈ M ([a, b]) with Λ ≥ 0. By using this definition of u, we
see that for each state-action pair (s, a),
〈Λ, (z (s, a)− η)−〉 =
ˆ b
a
(z (s, a)− η)− Λ (dη) = u (z (s, a)) .
Further, we can apply the Fubini theorem again to obtain
〈Λ, y〉 =
ˆ b
a
E
[
(Y − η)−
]
Λ (dη) = E
[ˆ b
a
(Y − η)− Λ (dη)
]
= E [u (Y )] .
Next we verify that there is no duality gap between the primal problem (3.3) - (3.7) and its dual (4.1)
- (4.3). All three dual problems (4.1) - (4.3), (4.4) - (4.6), and (4.7) - (4.9) are equivalent so the upcoming
results apply to all of them.
The following result states that the optimal values of problems (3.3) - (3.7) and (4.1) - (4.3) are equal.
Afterwards, we will show that the optimal value of problem (4.1) - (4.3) is attained, establishing strong
duality.
Theorem 4.4. The optimal values of problems (3.3) - (3.7) and (4.1) - (4.3) are equal,
ρ∗ =max {R (π, ν) : (π, ν) ∈ ∆}
= inf {β − 〈Λ, y〉 : (4.2), (h, β,Λ) ∈ Fwˆ (S)× R×M ([a, b]) , Λ ≥ 0} .
Proof. Apply [27, Theorem 12.3.4], which in turn follows from [2, Theorem 3.9]. Introduce slack variables
α ∈ C ([a, b]) for the dominance constraints L1µ ≥ y. We must show that the set
H , {(L0µ, 〈µ, 1〉, L1x− α, 〈µ, r〉 − ζ) : µ ≥ 0, α ≥ 0, ζ ≥ 0}
is weakly closed (closed in the weak topology). Let (D, ≤) be a directed (partially ordered) set, and consider
a net
{(µκ, ακ, ζκ) : κ ∈ D}
where µκ ≥ 0, ακ ≥ 0, and ζκ ≥ 0 in Mw (K)× R× C ([a, b]) such that
(L0µκ, 〈µκ, 1〉, L1µκ − ακ, 〈µκ, r〉 − ζκ)
has weak limit (ν∗, γ∗, f∗, ρ∗) ∈ Mwˆ (S)× R× C ([a, b])× R. Specifically,
〈µκ, 1〉 → γ
∗
and
〈µκ, r〉 − ζκ → ρ
∗,
since weak convergence on R is equivalent to the usual notion of convergence,
〈L0µκ, g〉 → 〈ν
∗, g〉
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for all g ∈ Fwˆ (S), and
〈L1µκ − ακ,Λ〉 → 〈f
∗,Λ〉
for all Λ ∈ M ([a, b]). We must show that (ν∗, γ∗, f∗, ρ∗) ∈ H under these conditions, i.e. that there exist
x ≥ 0, α ≥ 0, and ζ ≥ 0 such that
ν∗ = L0µ, γ
∗ = 〈µ, 1〉, f∗ = L1µ− α, ρ
∗ = 〈µ, r〉 − ζ.
The fact that there exist µ ≥ 0 and ζ ≥ 0 such that
ν∗ = L0µ, γ
∗ = 〈µ, 1〉, ρ∗ = 〈µ, r〉 − ζ,
is already established in [27, Theorem 12.3.4], and applies to our setting without modification.
It remains to verify that there exists α ∈ C ([a, b]) with α ≥ 0 and f∗ = L1µ− α. Choose Λ = δη for the
Dirac delta function at η ∈ [a, b] to see that
[L1µκ] (η)− ακ (η)→ f
∗ (η)
for all η ∈ [a, b], establishing pointwise convergence. Pointwise convergence on a compact set implies uniform
convergence, so in fact
L1µκ − ακ → f
∗
in the supremum norm topology on C ([a, b]). Since L1µκ ∈ C ([a, b]) and f
∗ ∈ C ([a, b]), it follows that
L1µκ − f
∗ ∈ C ([a, b]) for any κ. Define ακ = L1µκ − f
∗ and α = L1µ − f
∗, and notice that α ≥ 0
necessarily.
The next theorem shows that the dual problem (4.1) - (4.3) is solvable, i.e. there exists (h∗, β∗,Λ∗)
satisfying r + L∗0h
∗ − β∗ 1 + L∗1Λ
∗ ≤ 0 that attain the optimal value
β∗ − 〈Λ∗, y〉 = ρ∗.
When problem (4.1) - (4.3) is solvable, we are justified in saying that strong duality holds: the optimal values
of both problems (3.3) - (3.7) and (4.1) - (4.3) are equal and both problems attain their optimal value.
To continue we make some assumptions in line with [23].
Assumption 4.5. There exists a minimizing sequence (hn, βn,Λn) in problem (4.1) - (4.3) such that
(a) {βn} is bounded in R,
(b) {hn} is bounded in Fwˆ (S), and
(c) {Λn} is bounded in the weak* topology on M ([a, b]).
We establish strong duality next. To reiterate, strong duality holds when the optimal values of problems
(3.3) - (3.7) and (4.1) - (4.3) are equal, and both problems are solvable.
Theorem 4.6. Suppose assumption 4.5 holds. Strong duality holds between problem (3.3) - (3.7) and problem
(4.1) - (4.3).
Proof. Let (hn, βn,Λn) ∈ Fwˆ (S)×R×M ([a, b]) for n ≥ 0 be a minimizing sequence of triples given in the
preceding assumption 4.5:
r (s, a) +
ˆ b
a
(z (s, a)− η)− Λ
n (dη) ≤ βn + hn (s)−
ˆ
S
hn (ξ)Q (dξ | s, a) , ∀ (s, a) ∈ K,
for all n ≥ 0 and
βn −
ˆ b
a
E
[
(Y − η)−
]
Λn (dη) ↓ ρ∗.
Since the sequence {βn} is bounded, it has a convergent subsequence with limn→∞ β
n = β∗.
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Now {Λn} is bounded in M ([a, b]) in the weak* topology induced by C ([a, b]) by assumption. Since
{Λn} is bounded, the sequence can be scaled to lie in the closed unit ball ofM ([a, b]) in the weak* topology.
Since C ([a, b]) is separable (there exists a countable dense set, i.e. the polynomials with rational coefficients),
the weak* topology on M ([a, b]) is metrizable. By the Banach-Alaoglu theorem, it follows that {Λn} has a
subsequence that converges to some Λ∗ in the weak* topology, i.e.
〈Λn, f〉 → 〈Λ∗, f〉
for all f ∈ C ([a, b]). In particular, since E
[
(Y − η)−
]
and (z (s, a)− η)− are continuous functions on [a, b]
for all (s, a) ∈ K, it follows that
lim
n→∞
ˆ b
a
E
[
(Y − η)−
]
Λn (dη) =
ˆ b
a
E
[
(Y − η)−
]
Λ∗ (dη)
and
lim
n→∞
ˆ b
a
(z (s, a)− η)− Λ
n (dη) =
ˆ b
a
(z (s, a)− η)− Λ
∗ (dη) .
Finally, since {hn} is bounded in Fwˆ (S) we can define
h∗ (s) , lim inf
m→∞
hn (s)
for all s ∈ S. Then the function h∗ (s) is bounded in Fwˆ (S), and
lim inf
n→∞
ˆ
S
hn (ξ)Q (dξ | s, a) ≥
ˆ
S
h∗ (ξ)Q (dξ | s, a)
by Fatou’s lemma. Taking the limit, it follows that (h∗, β∗,Λ∗) is an optimal solution to the dual problem.
The role of the utility function u in problem (4.7) - (4.9) is fairly intuitive. The function u serves as an
additional pricing variable for the performance function z (s, a), and the total reward is treated as if it were
r (s, a) + u (z (s, a)). Problem (4.7) - (4.9) leads to a new version of the optimality equations for average
reward based on infinite-dimensional linear programming complementary slackness.
Theorem 4.7. Let µ∗ = µˆ∗ · φ∗ be an optimal solution to problem (3.3) - (3.7), and (h∗, β∗, u∗) be an
optimal solution to problem (4.1) - (4.3). Then
〈µ∗, u∗ (z)〉 = E [u∗ (Y )] ,
and
β∗ + h∗ (s) = sup
a∈A(s)
{
r (s, a) + u∗ (z (s, a)) +
ˆ
S
h∗ (ξ)Q (dξ | s, a)
}
for µˆ∗−almost all s ∈ S.
Proof. There is a corresponding optimal solution (h∗, β∗,Λ∗) to problem (4.1) - (4.3). Complementary
slackness between problems (3.3) - (3.7) and (4.1) - (4.3) gives 〈Λ∗, L1µ
∗ − y〉 = 0, where (h∗, β∗, u∗) is a
corresponding optimal solution of problem (4.1) - (4.3). Then
〈Λ∗, L1µ
∗〉 = 〈L∗1Λ
∗, µ∗〉 = 〈µ∗, u∗ (z)〉
and 〈Λ∗, y〉 = E [u∗ (Y )].
Complementary slackness also gives
〈r + L∗0h
∗ − β∗ 1 + L∗1Λ
∗, µ∗〉 = 0,
which yields the second statement since µ∗ ≥ 0 and r + L∗0h
∗ − β∗ 1 + L∗1Λ
∗ ≤ 0.
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5 Variations and extensions
5.1 Multivariate integral stochastic orders
We extend our repertoire in this section to include some additional stochastic orders. Integral stochastic
orders (see [33]) refer to stochastic orders that are defined in terms of families of functions. The increasing
concave stochastic order is an example of an integral stochastic order, because it is defined in terms of
the family of increasing concave functions. We now give attention to some multivariate integral stochastic
orders. So far, we have considered a z : K → R that is a scalar-valued function. In practice there are usually
many system performance measures of interest, so it is logical to consider vector valued z : K → Rn as well.
For example, z (s, a) may represent the service rate to n customers in a wireless network. The empirical
distribution limT→∞
1
T
∑T−1
t=0 z (st, at) is now a vector-valued random variable on R
n.
Recall the multivariate increasing concave stochastic order. For random vectors X, Y ∈ Rn, X dom-
inates Y in the increasing concave stochastic order, written X ≥icv Y , if E [u (X)] ≥ E [u (Y )] for all
increasing concave functions u : Rn → R such that both expectations exist. Unlike univariate ≥icv, there
is no parametrized family of functions (like (x− η)−) that generates all the multivariate increasing concave
functions. This result rests on the fact that the set of extreme points of the increasing concave functions on
R
n to R is dense for n ≥ 2, see [28, 7].
As in [13], we can relax the condition X ≥icv Y by constructing a tractable parametrized family of
increasing concave functions. Let u (·; ξ) : Rn → R represent a family of increasing concave functions
parametrized by ξ ∈ Ξ ⊂ Rp where Ξ is compact. Then, the family of functions {u (·; ξ)}ξ∈Ξ is a subset of
all increasing concave functions and leads to a relaxation of ≥icv. We say X dominates Y with respect to
the integral stochastic order generated by {u (·; ξ)}ξ∈Ξ if E [u (X ; ξ)] ≥ E [u (Y ; ξ)] for all ξ ∈ Ξ. Define
Zξ (π, ν) = lim inf
T→∞
1
T
E
π
ν
[
T−1∑
t=0
u (z (st, at) ; ξ)
]
for all ξ ∈ Ξ. For convenience, we assume u (x; ξ) is continuous in ξ ∈ Ξ for any x ∈ Rn.
We propose the multivariate dominance-constrained MDP:
sup R (π, ν) (5.1)
s.t. Zξ (π, ν) ≥ E [u (Y ; ξ)] , ∀ξ ∈ Ξ, (5.2)
π ∈ Π. (5.3)
using {u (·; ξ)}ξ∈Ξ.
By the same reasoning as earlier,
Zξ (φ, µˆ) = 〈µ, u (z (s, a) ; ξ)〉 =
ˆ
S
[ˆ
A
u (z (s, a) ; ξ)φ (da | s)
]
µˆ (ds)
for all ξ ∈ Ξ when µ = µˆ · φ ∈ ∆s.
Lemma 5.1. For any µ ∈ P (K), 〈µ, u (z; ξ)〉 is continuous in ξ.
Proof. Write 〈µ, u (z; ξ)〉 =
´
K
u (z (s, a) ; ξ)µ (d (s, a)). Certainly each function u (z (s, a) ; ξ) is continuous
in ξ for any fixed s × a. Since µ is finite, it follows that the integral of u (z (s, a) ; ξ) with respect to µ is
continuous in ξ.
Let C (Ξ) be the space of continuous functions on Ξ in the supremum norm,
‖f‖C(Ξ) , sup
x∈Ξ
|f (ξ) |.
We will express the dominance constraints (5.2) as a linear operator in C (Ξ). This operator depends on the
parametrization u (·; ξ). The preceding lemma justifies defining L1 : M (S ×A)→ C (Ξ) by
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[L1x] (ξ) , 〈x, u (z; ξ)〉, ξ ∈ Ξ. (5.4)
Also define the continuous function y ∈ C (Ξ) by y (ξ) = E [u (Y ; ξ)] for all ξ ∈ Ξ to represent the benchmark.
The steady-state version of problem (5.1) - (5.3) is the modified linear program:
max 〈µ, r〉 (5.5)
s.t. L0µ = 0, (5.6)
〈µ, 1〉 = 1, (5.7)
L1µ ≥ y, (5.8)
µ ∈Mw (K) , µ ≥ 0. (5.9)
Problem (5.5) - (5.9) is almost the same as problem (3.3) - (3.7), except that now L1µ is an element in C (Ξ)
to reflect the multivariate dominance constraint.
We now compute the adjoint of L1, which depends on the choice of family {u (·; ξ) : ξ ∈ Ξ}. The
parametrization u (·; ξ) will appear explicitly in this computation.
Lemma 5.2. The adjoint of L1 is L
∗
1 : M (Ξ)→ Fw (K) where
[L∗1Λ] (s, a) ,
ˆ
Ξ
u (z (s, a) ; ξ) Λ (dξ) .
Proof. Write
〈Λ, L1µ〉 =
ˆ
Ξ
〈µ, u (z; ξ)〉Λ (dξ)
=
ˆ
Ξ
[ˆ
K
u (z (s, a) ; ξ)〉µ (d (s, a))
]
Λ (dξ) .
When z is bounded on S ×A, then
|
ˆ
u (z; ξ) (µ× Λ) (d ((s, a)× ξ)) | ≤ ‖u (z (·) ; ξ) ‖Fw(K) ‖µ‖Mw(K)‖Λ‖M([a,b]) <∞.
The Fubini theorem applies to justify interchange of the order of integration,
〈Λ, L1µ〉 =
ˆ
K
[ˆ
Ξ
u (z (s, a) ; ξ) Λ (dξ)
]
µ (d (s, a))
=
ˆ
K
〈Λ, u (z (s, a) ; ξ)〉µ (d (s, a)) .
The dual to problem (5.5) - (5.9) looks identical to problem (4.1) - (4.3) and is now explicitly
inf β −
ˆ
Ξ
E [u (Y ; ξ)] Λ (dξ) (5.10)
s.t. r (s, a) +
ˆ
Ξ
u (z (s, a) ; ξ) Λ (dξ) ≤ β + h (s)−
ˆ
S
h (ξ)Q (dξ | s, a) , ∀ (s, a) ∈ K, (5.11)
(h, β,Λ) ∈ Fwˆ (S)× R×M (Ξ) , Λ ≥ 0. (5.12)
Define
U (Ξ) =cl cone {u (x; ξ) : ξ ∈ Ξ}
=
{
u (x) =
ˆ
Ξ
u (x; ξ) Λ (dξ) for Λ ∈M (Ξ) , Λ ≥ 0
}
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to be the closure of the cone of functions generated by {u (x; ξ) : ξ ∈ Ξ}. In this case U (Ξ) is a family of
functions in C (Rn), the space of continuous functions f : Rn → R. We see immediately that problem (5.10)
- (5.12) is equivalent to
inf β − E [u (Y )] (5.13)
s.t. r (s, a) + u (z (s, a)) ≤ β + h (s)−
ˆ
S
h (ξ)Q (dξ | s, a) , ∀ (s, a) ∈ K, (5.14)
(h, β, u) ∈ Fwˆ (S)× R× U (Ξ) . (5.15)
The variables u ∈ U (Ξ) in problem (5.13) - (5.15) are now pricing variables for the vector z. When our earlier
assumptions are suitably adapted, then strong duality holds between problem (5.5) - (5.9) and problem (5.13)
- (5.15).
Theorem 5.3. The optimal values of problems (5.5) - (5.9) and (5.10) - (5.12) are equal. Further, the
dual problem (5.10) - (5.12) is solvable and strong duality holds between problems (5.5) - (5.9) and (5.10) -
(5.12).
5.2 Discounted reward
We briefly sketch the development for discounted reward, it is mostly similar. Discounted cost MDPs in
Borel spaces with finitely many constraints are considered in [22]. Introduce the discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1)
and consider the long-run expected discounted reward
R (π, ν) = Eπν
[
∞∑
t=0
δtr (st, at)
]
.
We are interested in the distribution of discounted reward z,
∞∑
t=0
δtz (st, at) .
Define
Zη (π, ν) , E
π
ν
[
∞∑
t=0
δt (z (st, at)− η)−
]
.
We propose the dominance-constrained MDP:
sup R (π, ν) (5.16)
s.t. Zη (π, ν) ≥ E
[
(Y − η)−
]
, ∀η ∈ [a, b] , (5.17)
π ∈ Π. (5.18)
We work with the δ−discounted expected occupation measure
µπν (Γ) ,
∞∑
t=0
δtP πν ((st, at) ∈ Γ)
for all Γ ∈ B (S ×A). Now let
[L0µ] (B) , µˆ (B)− δ
ˆ
S×A
Q (B | s, a)µ (d (s, a)) , ∀B ∈ B (S) , (5.19)
and
[L1µ] (η) , 〈µ, (z − η)−〉, ∀η ∈ [a, b] . (5.20)
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Also continue to define y ∈ C ([a, b]) by y (η) = E
[
(Y − η)−
]
for all η ∈ [a, b]. Problem (5.16) - (5.18) is then
equivalent to the linear program
max 〈µ, r〉 (5.21)
s.t. L0µ = ν, (5.22)
L1µ ≥ y, (5.23)
µ ∈ M (K) , µ ≥ 0. (5.24)
Introduce Lagrange multipliers h ∈ Fwˆ (S) for constraint L0µ = ν and multipliers Λ ∈ M ([a, b]) for
constraint L1µ ≥ y, the Lagrangian is then
ϑ (µ, h,Λ) = 〈µ, r〉+ 〈h, L0µ− ν〉+ 〈Λ, L1µ− y〉.
The adjoint of L0 is L
∗
0 : Fwˆ (S)→ Fw (S ×A) defined by
[L∗0h] (s, a) , h (s)− δ
ˆ
S
h (ξ)Q (dξ | s, a) .
The adjoint of L1 is still L
∗
1 : M ([a, b])→ Fw (S ×A) where
[L∗1Λ] (s, a) ,
ˆ b
a
(z (s, a)− η)− Λ (dη) .
The form of the dual follows.
Theorem 5.4. The dual to problem (5.21) - (5.24) is
min 〈h, ν〉 − 〈Λ, y〉 (5.25)
s.t. r + L∗0h+ L
∗
1Λ ≥ 0, (5.26)
h ∈ Fw (K) , Λ ∈ M ([a, b]) , Λ ≥ 0. (5.27)
The optimal values of problems (5.21) - (5.24) and (5.25) - (5.27) are equal, and problem (5.25) - (5.27) is
solvable.
This dual is explicitly
min 〈h, ν〉 − E [u (Y )] (5.28)
s.t. r (s, a) + u (z (s, a)) ≤ h (s)− δ
ˆ
S
h (ξ)Q (dξ | s, a) , ∀ (s, a) ∈ K, (5.29)
h ∈ Fw (K) , u ∈ U ([a, b]) . (5.30)
Problem (5.28) - (5.30) leads to a modified set of optimality equations for the infinite horizon discounted
reward case, namely
h (s) = max
a∈A(s)
{
r (s, a) + u (z (s, a)) + δ
ˆ
S
h (ξ)Q (dξ | s, a)
}
for all s ∈ S.
5.3 Approximate linear programming
Various approaches have been put forward for solving infinite-dimensional LPs with sequences of finite-
dimensional LPs, such as in [24, 31]. Approximate linear programming (ALP) has been put forward as
an approach to the curse of dimensionality, and it can be applied to our present setting. The average
reward linear program (3.3) - (3.7) and the discounted reward linear program (5.21) - (5.24) generally have
uncountably many variables and constraints.
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ALP for average cost dynamic programming is developed in [8]. Previous work on ALP for dynamic
programming has focused on approximating the cost-to-go function h rather than the steady-state occupation
measure µ. It is more intuitive to design basis functions for the cost-to-go function than the occupation
measure. For problem (3.3) - (3.7), we approximate the cost-to-go function h ∈ Fwˆ (S) with the basis
functions {φ1, . . . , φm} ⊂ Fwˆ (S). We approximate the pricing variable u ∈ U ([a, b]) with basis functions
{u1, . . . , un} ⊂ U ([a, b]). The resulting approximate linear program is
min β − E
[
n∑
i=1
αiui (Y )
]
(5.31)
s.t. r (s, a) +
n∑
i=1
αiui (z (s, a)) ≤ β +
m∑
j=1
γjhj (s)−
ˆ
S

 m∑
j=1
γjhj

 (ξ)Q (dξ | s, a) , ∀ (s, a) ∈ K, (5.32)
(γ, β, α) ∈ Rm × R× Rn. (5.33)
We are justified in writing minimization instead of infimum in problem (5.31) - (5.33) because there are only
finitely many decision variables. ALP has been studied extensively for the linear programming representation
of the optimality equations for discounted infinite horizon dynamic programming (see [16, 17, 14]). The
discounted approximate linear program is
min 〈h, ν〉 − E
[
n∑
i=1
αiui (Y )
]
(5.34)
s.t. r (s, a) +
n∑
i=1
αiui (z (s, a)) ≤
m∑
j=1
γjhj (s)− δ
ˆ
S

 m∑
j=1
γjhj

 (ξ)Q (dξ | s, a) , ∀ (s, a) ∈ K, (5.35)
(γ, α) ∈ Rm × Rn. (5.36)
Both problems (5.31) - (5.33) and (5.34) - (5.36) are restrictions of the corresponding problems (4.7) - (4.9)
and (5.28) - (5.30).
Problems (5.31) - (5.33) and (5.34) - (5.36) have a manageable number of decision variables but an
intractable number of constraints. Constraint sampling has been a prominent tool in ALP, and we cite a
relevant result now. Let
〈γz , r〉+ κz ≥ 0, ∀z ∈ L, (5.37)
be a set of linear inequalities in the variables r ∈ Rk indexed by an arbitrary set L. Let ψ be a probability
distribution on L, we would like to take i.i.d. samples from L to construct a set W ⊆ L with
sup{
r | 〈γz,r〉+κz≥0, ∀z∈W
}ψ ({y : 〈γy, r〉 + κy < 0}) ≤ ǫ.
Theorem 5.5. [17, Theorem 2.1] For any δ ∈ (0, 1) and ǫ ∈ (0, 1), and
m ≥
4
ǫ
(
k ln
12
ǫ
+ ln
2
δ
)
,
a set W of m i.i.d. samples drawn from L according to distribution ψ, satisfies
sup
{r | 〈γz,r〉+κz≥0, ∀z∈W}
ψ ({y : 〈γy, r〉+ κy < 0}) ≤ ǫ
with probability at least 1− δ.
Thus, we can sample state-action pairs from any distribution ψ on K to obtain tractable relaxations of
problems (5.31) - (5.33) and (5.34) - (5.36) with probabilistic feasibility guarantees. Note that the number
of samples required is O
(
1
ǫ ln
1
ǫ , ln
1
δ
)
.
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5.4 Finite state and action spaces
The development for finite state and action spaces is much simpler. Now both problems (3.3) - (3.7) and (4.1)
- (4.3) are usual linear programming problems with finitely many variables and constraints. The usual linear
programming duality theory applies immediately to establish strong duality between these two problems.
For this section, let x denote an occupation measure on K to emphasize that it is finite-dimensional.
Also suppose the benchmark Y has finite support suppY = {η1, . . . , ηq} ⊂ R, so that constraint (2.5) is
equivalent to
Ex
[
(z (s, a)− η)−
]
≥ E
[
(Y − η)−
]
, ∀η ∈ suppY, (5.38)
by [9, Proposition 3.2]. Each expectation
Ex
[
(z (s, a)− η)−
]
=
∑
(s,a)∈K
x (s, a) (z (s, a)− η)−
is a linear function of x.
For finite state and action spaces, the steady-state version of problem (2.3) - (2.5) is:
max
∑
(s,a)∈K
r (s, a)x (s, a) (5.39)
s.t.
∑
a∈As
x (j, a)−
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A(s)
P (j | s, a)x (s, a) = 0, ∀j ∈ S, (5.40)
∑
(s,a)∈Ψ
x (s, a) = 1, (5.41)
Ex
[
(z (s, a)− η)−
]
≥ E
[
(Y − η)−
]
, ∀η ∈ suppY, (5.42)
x ≥ 0. (5.43)
Duality for problem (3.3) - (3.7) is immediate from linear programming duality. As discussed in [34, Chapter
8], the dual of the linear programming problem without the dominance constraints is
min g
s.t. g + h (s)−
∑
j∈S
P (j | s, a)h (j) ≥ r (s, a) , ∀ (s, a) ∈ K,
g ∈ R, h ∈ R|s|.
The vector h is interpreted as the average cost-to-go function. To proceed with the dual for problem (3.3) -
(3.7), let λ ∈ R|Y| with λ ≥ 0 and consider the piecewise linear increasing concave function
u (ξ) =
∑
η∈Y
λ (η) (ξ − η)−
with breakpoints at η ∈ Y. The above function u (ξ) can be interpreted as a utility function for a risk-averse
decision maker. We define
U (Y) =cl cone
{
(x− η)− : η ∈ Y
}
=

u (x) =
∑
η∈Y
λ (η) (x− η)− for λ ∈ R
|Y|, λ ≥ 0


to be the set of all such functions. Since Y is assumed to be finite, U (Y) is a finite dimensional set.
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Theorem 5.6. The dual to problem (5.39) - (5.43) is
min g − E [u (Y )] (5.44)
s.t. r (s, a) + u (z (s, a)) ≤ g + h (s)−
∑
j∈S
P (j | s, a)h (j) , ∀ (s, a) ∈ K, (5.45)
g ∈ R, h ∈ R|S|, u ∈ U (Y) . (5.46)
Strong duality holds between problem (5.39) - (5.43) and problem (5.44) - (5.46).
Proof. Introduce the Lagrangian
L (x, g, h, λ) ,
∑
(s,a)∈K
r (s, a)x (s, a) + g

 ∑
(s,a)∈K
x (s, a)− 1


+
∑
j∈S
h (j)

 ∑
a∈A(s)
x (j, a)−
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A(s)
P (j | s, a)x (s, a)


+
∑
η∈Y
λ (η)



 ∑
(s,a)∈K
x (s, a) (z (s, a)− η)− − E
[
(Y − η)−
]

 .
Define the increasing concave function
u (ξ) =
∑
η∈Y
λ (η) (ξ − η)− ,
then
∑
η∈Y
λ (η)



 ∑
(s,a)∈K
x (s, a)
[
(z (s, a)− η)−
]
− E
[
(Y − η)−
]


=
∑
(s,a)∈K
x (s, a) (u (z (s, a)))− E [u (Y )]
by interchanging finite sums. So, the Lagrangian could also be written as
L (x, g, h, u) =
∑
(s,a)∈K
r (s, a)x (s, a) + g

 ∑
(s,a)∈K
x (s, a)− 1


+
∑
j∈S
h (j)

 ∑
a∈A(s)
x (j, a)−
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A(s)
P (j | s, a)x (s, a)


+
∑
(s,a)∈K
x (s, a)u (z (s, a))− E [u (Y )] ,
for u ∈ U . The dual to problem (5.43) - (5.42) is defined as
min
g∈R, h∈R|S|, u∈U(Y)
{
max
x≥0
L (x, g, h, u)
}
.
Rearranging the Lagrangian gives
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L (x, g, h, u) =
∑
(s,a)∈K
x (s, a)

r (s, a) + g + h (s)−∑
j∈S
P (j | s, a)h (j) + u (z (s, a))


− g − E [u (Y )] ,
so that the dual to problem (5.43) - (5.42) is
min − g − E [u (Y )]
s.t. r (s, a) + g + h (s)−
∑
j∈S
P (j | s, a)h (j) + u (z (s, a)) ≤ 0, ∀ (s, a) ∈ K,
g ∈ R, h ∈ R|S|, u ∈ U (Y) .
Since g and h are unrestricted, take g = −g and h = −h to get the desired result.
We used linear programming duality in the preceding proof for illustration. Alternatively, we could have
just applied our general strong duality result from earlier. It is immediate that problem (5.45) - (5.46) is the
finite-dimensional version of problem (4.7) - (4.9).
There is no difficulty with the Slater condition for problems (5.42) - (5.43) and (5.45) - (5.46) as there
is in [9, 10]. In [9, 10], the decision variable in a stochastic program is a random variable so stochastic
dominance constraints are nonlinear. In our case, the decision variable x is in the space of measures and the
dominance constraints are linear. Linear programming duality does not depend on the Slater condition.
The development for the discounted case is similar. In terms of discounted occupation measures x,
problem (5.18) - (5.17) is
max
∑
(s,a)∈K
r (s, a)x (s, a) (5.47)
s.t.
∑
a∈As
x (j, a)−
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A(s)
γ P (j | s, a)x (s, a) = α (j) , ∀j ∈ S, (5.48)
Ex
[
(z (s, a)− η)−
]
≥ E
[
(Y − η)−
]
, ∀η ∈ Y, (5.49)
x ≥ 0. (5.50)
We compute the dual to problem (5.47) - (5.50) in the next theorem using the space of utility functions U
from earlier.
Theorem 5.7. The dual to problem (5.47) - (5.50) is
min
∑
j∈S
α (j) v (j)− E [u (Y )] (5.51)
s.t. v (s)−
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈As
γ P (j | s, a) v (j) ≥ r (s, a) + u (z (s, a)) , ∀ (s, a) ∈ K, (5.52)
v ∈ R|S|, u ∈ U (Y) . (5.53)
Strong duality holds between problem (5.47) - (5.50) and problem (5.51) - (5.53).
6 Portfolio optimization
We use an infinite horizon discounted portfolio optimization problem to illustrate our ideas in this section.
A single period portfolio optimization with stochastic dominance constraints is analyzed in [11]. Specifically,
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the model in [11] puts a stochastic dominance constraint on the return rate of a portfolio allocation. We
use this model as our motivation for the dynamic setting and put a stochastic dominance constraint on the
discounted infinite horizon return rate.
Suppose there are n assets whose prices evolve according to a discrete time Markov chain. We can include
a risk-less asset with a constant return rate in this set. The asset prices at time t are
pt = (pt (1) , . . . , pt (n)) ∈ R
n,
where pt (i) is the price per share of asset i at time t. The portfolio at time t is captured by
xt = (xt (1) , . . . , xt (n)) ∈ R
n,
where xt (i) is the quantity of shares held of asset i at time t. For a cleaner model, we just treat each xt (i)
as a continuous decision variable. We require
∑n
i=1 xt (i) = 1 and xt ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0, there is no shorting.
The total wealth at time t is then 〈pt, xt〉.
At each time t ≥ 0, the investor observes the current prices of the assets and then updates portfolio
positions subject to transaction costs before new prices are realized. Let at ⊂ R
n be the buying and selling
decisions at time t, where at (i) is the total change in the number of shares held of asset i. Define
A (p, x) , {a ∈ Rn : x (i) + a (i) ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n,
n∑
i=1
p (i) a (i) = 0
}
,
to be the set of feasible reallocations given prices and holdings x. The constraint
∑n
i=1 p (i) a (i) = 0 requires
the total change in wealth from buying and selling decisions to be zero in any period. The system dynamic
for portfolio positions is then
xt (t+ 1) = xt (i) + at (i) , i = 1, . . . , n, t ≥ 0. (6.1)
The transaction costs c : A→ R are defined to be
c (a) ,
n∑
i=1
at (i)
2
,
this cost function is a moment on S ×A.
The overall return rate between time t and t+ 1 is
z (pt, xt; pt+1, xt+1) ,
〈pt+1, xt+1〉 − 〈pt, xt〉
〈pt, xt〉
.
We make the reasonable assumption that z (pt, xt; pt+1, xt+1) is bounded for this example.
We want to minimize discounted transaction costs
C (π, ν) , Eπν

∑
t≥0
δtc (at)


subject to a stochastic dominance constraint on the discounted return rate. Define
Zη (π, ν) , E
π
ν
[
∞∑
t=0
δt (z (pt, xt; pt+1, xt+1)− η)−
]
to be the expected discounted shortfall in relative returns at level η. We introduce a benchmark Y for the
discounted return rate, and we suppose the support of Y is bounded within [a, b]. In this example, the
benchmark can be taken as any market index.
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We absorb the system dynamic (6.1) into a transition kernel Q. Our resulting portfolio optimization
problem is then
max
π∈Π
− C (π, ν) (6.2)
s.t. Zη (π, ν) ≥ E
[
(Y − η)−
]
, η ∈ [a, b] . (6.3)
In the linear programming formulation of (6.2) - (6.3), we simply augment the state space and consider
occupation measures over sequences
(pt, xt, at; pt+1, xt+1, at+1)
to correctly compute z.
7 Conclusion
We have shown how to use stochastic dominance constraints in infinite horizon MDPs. Convex analytic
methods establish that stochastic dominance constrained MDPs can be solved via linear programming, and
have corresponding dual linear programming problems. Conditions are given for strong duality to hold
between these two linear programs. Utility functions appear in the dual as pricing variables corresponding
to the stochastic dominance constraints. This result has intuitive appeal, since our stochastic dominance
constraints are defined in terms of utility functions, and parallels earlier results [9, 10, 12]. Our results are
shown to be extendable to many types of stochastic dominance constraints, particularly multivariate ones.
There are three main directions for our future work. First, we will consider efficient strategies for
computing the optimal policy to stochastic dominance constrained MDPs. Second, we would like explore
other methods for modeling risk in MDPs using convex analytic methods. Specifically, we are interested
in solving MDPs with convex risk measures and chance constraints with “static” optimization problems
as we have done here. Third, as suggested by the portfolio example, we will consider online data-driven
optimization for the stochastic dominance-constrained MDPs in this paper. The transition probabilities of
underlying MDPs are not known in practice and must be learned online.
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